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Abstract
Under relative performance pay, other-regarding workers internalize the
negative externality they impose on other workers. In one form increased
own e¤ort reduces otherspayo¤s this results in other-regarding individuals
depressing e¤orts. In another form punishment reduces the payo¤ of other
workers groups with other-regarding individuals feature higher e¤orts because
it is more di¢ cult for these individuals to sustain low-e¤ort (collusive) out-
comes. We explore these e¤ects experimentally and nd other-regarding work-
ers tend to depress e¤orts by 15% on average. However, selsh workers are
nearly three times more likely to lead workers to coordinate on minimal e¤orts
when communication is possible. Hence, the social preferences composition of
a team of workers has nuanced consequences on e¤orts.
Keywords: Social Preferences, Relative Performance, Collusion, Leader-
ship
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1 Introduction
Relative performance incentives are a common feature of the workplace environment.
They appear in many di¤erent forms: be it monthly or yearly bonuses or promotions
within an organization. An interesting feature of relative incentive pay is that a
workers performance also a¤ects his or her co-workers compensation; in particular,
it imposes a negative externality. An increase in ones own performance will not
only increase ones own compensation, but inevitably also decrease a co-workers pay,
at least in expectation. How this externality a¤ects the incentives of a worker will
crucially depend on whether a worker incorporates this reduction in his or her own
e¤ort decision. A worker who incorporates a co-workers payo¤s can also be referred
to as other-regardingwhile a worker basing decisions solely on own payo¤s can be
referred to as selsh;these di¤erent types of workers should then respond di¤erently
to relative incentives. A robust nding in the literature is that individuals have
heterogeneous degrees of other-regardingness (e.g., see Andreoni and Miller (2002)
and Fisman, Kariv and Markovitz (2007)), which suggests that the e¤ectiveness of
relative incentives will depend on particular worker social preferences.
In this paper, we explore how social preferences of this form a¤ect e¤ort provision
in a relative incentive framework using a controlled laboratory environment. In par-
ticular, we measure subjectssocial preferences using dictator menus and then relate
these to their e¤ort decisions under relative incentives. Thus, we contribute to the
understanding of the e¢ cacy of relative incentives.
A rst-order question for rms is what types of workers to hire. If a rm uses
relative incentives, it is especially important not to treat each hiring decision in
isolation; since individual e¤ort decisions are strategically linked to others e¤ort
decisions, group composition becomes quite important. Our experimental design
allows us to randomly assign subjects with di¤erent levels of other-regardingness into
groups and thus identify the e¤ect of group composition on e¤ort. In addition, we
employ an indenitely repeated game setting to capture the feature that workplace
interactions are usually not one shot but instead have some probability of continuing
in the future. In this setting, we nd that groups with more other-regarding workers
tend to depress e¤orts. When communication is not part of the work environment,
each other-regarding group member depresses overall e¤ort by 15%. At the individual
level we nd that, absent communication, own social preferences matter for e¤ort
decisions, while individuals are not signicantly a¤ected by the other group members
social preferences.
Communication is, of course, an important feature of many workplace settings.
In an indenitely repeated relative performance setting, communication can help
workers coordinate their e¤ort choices to their mutual benet. To facilitate such
coordination it is expected a leader will emerge. Here we use the term leader in the
sense of leader as a coordinator, as argued by Kreps (1986) and Hermalin (2012). To
shed additional light on the e¤ect of social preferences, we further analyze whether
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social preferences relate to the emergence of a coordinating leader an individual
suggesting to the group to coordinate on minimal e¤ort, which is the Pareto optimal
outcome from the workersviewpoint. We nd that selsh individuals are 2.7 times
more likely than other-regarding individuals to successfully lead their groups to such a
collusiveoutcome. Controlling for this sort of leadership, we still nd that even with
communication, other-regarding subjects depress their e¤ort relative to selsh ones
by 50%. This implies that the e¤ect of social preferences on work performance under
relative incentives is a nuanced one. On the one hand, other-regarding workers have
a tendency to depress e¤ort, apparently through their internalizing of their e¤orts
negative externality. On the other hand, with the availability of communication,
selsh workers seem more likely to help direct the group to the lowest of e¤orts.
Thus, heterogenous groups may actually be the worst for a principal interested in
maximizing workforce e¤ort.
In order to eliminate possible confounds such as di¤erences in beliefs or degrees
of patience, we have subjects in a di¤erent treatment face computerized simulated
subjects exhibiting choice behavior similar to that of past human subjects. Thus,
while strategic incentives are left intact, social preferences are turned o¤ in this
treatment. In this setting, we nd that by the end of the relative performance stage,
other-regarding and selsh subjects are indistinguishable, lending support to our
hypothesis that di¤erences in social preferences are driving our results.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section we review the rele-
vant literature. In Section 3 we describe our experimental design and o¤er a simple
theoretical framework. Section 4 provides the results of the laboratory experiment.
In Section 5 we conclude and discuss organizational design implications.
2 Literature
The signicant body of literature that documents di¤erent degrees of social pref-
erences (e.g. Andreoni and Miller (2002); Fisman, Kariv and Markovitz (2007);
DellaVigna (2009)) has led researchers to investigate their e¤ects on public good con-
tributions and other pro-social behaviors under di¤erent incentive schemes (e.g. see
Bowles and Polania-Reyes (2012) for a survey). Fehr and Fischbacher (2002) also
point at that when scholars disregard social preferences, they fail to understand the
determinants and consequences of incentives. In our paper, we explore the e¤ects of
social preferences on productivity in the setting of relative performance incentives.
To our knowledge, the only past study that explores this issue is Bandiera, Rasul and
Barankay (2005). They nd that fruit pickers in the UK cooperate on lower levels
of e¤ort under relative performance pay only when monitoring is possible. However,
they also nd that workers with social ties even more strongly depress e¤ort when
monitoring is available. Social ties could capture social preferences; however, they
could also capture the salience of punishment should one defect from low e¤orts.
As a result, it is unclear whether social preferences induce lower e¤orts in this setting.
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Our paper complements this work by directly measuring participantssocial prefer-
ences (à la Andreoni and Miller (2002)) and randomly combining groups to identify
the link between social preferences and the responses to relative performance incen-
tives. In order to do so, we employ an indenitely repeated game setting to study
the e¤ect of social preferences even when collusion is possible.
In indenitely repeated games, Pareto improvements over the one-shot Nash equi-
librium can be obtained as equilibrium outcomes if the value of the future is high
enough. Versions of this folk theorem can be found in Friedman (1971), Fuden-
berg and Maskin (1986). Indeed, it has been documented that individuals are able to
achieve the Pareto-optimal outcomes quite often. For example, Palfrey and Rosenthal
(1994) found cooperation rates from 29% to 40% and Dal Bo (2005) found coopera-
tion rates of 38%. There is, however, a great variety of outcomes in this literature,
which may or may not correspond to equilibrium outcomes derived from standard
economic models, as Dreber, Fudenberg and Rand (2011) argue. Hence, while one
purpose of our paper is to study the e¤ect of social preferences on e¤ort in relative
performance schemes, a second purpose is to explain the di¤erent sources of variation
in group productivity by controlling for groupssocial preference composition.
This variation comes from the fact that indenitely repeated games may have
multiple equilibria. A usual criticism of the theory is that it does not provide sharp
predictions about equilibrium selection (e.g. Dal Bo and Frechette (2011)). One
method of dealing with equilibrium selection in games of coordination is analyzing the
behavior of a leader, as argued by Kreps (1986) and Hermalin (2012). The emergence
of such a leader may be related to social preferences. Indeed, a leadership-social
preference link is reported in recent work by Gaechter, Nosenzo, Renner and Sefton
(2012) and Kocher, Pogrebna and Sutter (2013). Our work complements theirs in that
we explore the endogenous emergence of leaders, whereas their leaders are determined
exogenously leaders are assigned and then behavior is explored. In addition, whereas
we study leadership through communication, the other papers study leadership by
example and by asserting authority, respectively. Finally, our work also contributes
to the literature on communication in games with multiple equilibria (e.g. Cooper,
R., D. V. DeJong, R. Forsythe, and T. W. Ross, 1992, Ledyard 1995; Seely, Van
Huyck and Battalio 2007); while the extant literature is concerned about the e¤ect
of communication on the frequency of Pareto optimal outcomes, we instead explore
how a groups social preference composition leads to patterns of communication (e.g.,
leadership emergence) that result in players coordinating on their Pareto optimal
outcome.
3 Experimental Design
In total, we conducted 8 experimental sessions with 168 subjects. Participants were
students from UC Berkeley, enrolled in the X-lab subject pool. Sessions lasted ap-
proximately 60 minutes from reading instructions to subject payment, which averaged
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approximately $16 per subject. Participants were not allowed to take part in more
than one session. The treatments were programmed and conducted using z-Tree de-
veloped by Fischbacher (2007).
We had the dual purpose of identifying subjectssocial preferences and measuring
their choices when facing a relative performance incentive scheme. In order to achieve
this, the experiment was divided into three stages. In the rst stage, we randomly
matched subjects into anonymous groups of three individuals. Participants were
then given 100 tokens for each of 9 periods and played a dictator game with their
group members (including themselves). In each period participants faced di¤erent
pricesor token exchange rates of giving to each group member. Prices varied such
that we could both identify individualswillingness to give to others and individuals
willingness to give between others when facing di¤erent prices of giving.1 We use
these 9 periods to classify our subjects in terms of social preferences. In periods
10 and 11 we conducted allocation decisions with positive sloped budget sets as in
Andreoni and Miller (2002) where subjects are given an allocation and decide on
the overall exchange rate. We will use these decisions to test whether aversion to
disadvantageous inequality matters in addition to other-regardingness in responding
to relative incentives. These results are reported in the Appendix. Since we follow the
categorization of Andreoni and Miller (2002), we are thus considering unconditional
rather than conditional social preferences.
Subjects did not learn their other group memberschoices to avoid uncontrolled
learning. Participants were told that for 5 out of a total of 11 allocation decisions
one of the group memberschoices would be randomly selected to compute payo¤s.
We use this rst stage, in particular decisions in rounds 1 to 9, to classify partic-
ipants as Selshor Other-Regarding.2 An archetypal Selsh type, is only inter-
ested in his own monetary payo¤ and thus should never allocate any tokens to his or
her group members. Thus we classify as Selsh all subjects that throughout rounds
1-9 do not allocate any tokens to another group member. The remainder of subjects
are classied as Other-Regarding. We consider various other possible classications
in the analysis found in our online appendix; however, they provide little additional
insight to this simple classication.
For the second stage, participants were again randomly matched with two other
players for the remainder of the experiment. They participate in a relative perfor-
mance game modeled after Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul (2005). The purpose of
this stage was to give players the possibility to collude by jointly providing low levels
1Fisman et al. (2007) uses a slightly di¤erent nomenclature to describe distributional preferences.
They call preferences for giving the fundamentals that rule the trade-o¤ between individiual and
otherspayo¤s and social preferences the ones that govern the allocation between others. Our study
does not focus on that distinction, therefore we employ the following terminology: We use social
preferencesor other regarding concernsindistinctly to represent non-selsh behavior.
2From now on we use the capitalized form of selsh and other-regarding to refer to our catego-
rization. Thus we do not imply that a subject we categorize as selsh necessarily always acts in a
selsh manner, but only that given our categorization, he or she most closely resembles this type.
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Treatment Subjects
Chat & Observability 63
No Chat & Observability 63
No Chat & No Observability 21
Robot 21
Total 168
Table 1: Summary of Treatments
of e¤ort. Thus, we implemented an indenitely repeated game with continuation
probability of  = 95%: In order to gain consistency across treatments, we randomly
drew the number of periods before running the sessions as in Fudenberg, Rand, and
Dreber (2012).
We also varied factors considered important for creating and sustaining collu-
sion. In particular, in the rst treatment (Chat/Observability) we allowed chat
via computer terminals during each period and observability of choices and payo¤s
after every period. In the second treatment (No Chat/Observability) we did not
allow for chat but continued with observability after each period. In the third treat-
ment (No Chat/No Observability) neither chat nor observability was allowed. In
this treatment, subjects only learned their own payo¤ after each period. Thus, this
treatment allows us to identify e¤ort levels when a players group memberse¤orts
are not directly observable. Since a priori we did not know how easily subjects would
collude, we wanted to provide di¤erent degrees of di¢ culty of coordinating.
If we were able to mechanically switch on and o¤ subjects social preferences, we
could directly identify the e¤ect of social preferences on e¤ort. Unfortunately, this is
not generally possible. However, we conducted a nal treatment where we approx-
imate this idea. Instead of facing human subjects, a subject played against their
computer, which simulated the play of past subjectsdecisions (Robottreatment).
This treatment attempted to switch o¤ social preferences by making it clear to
subjects that even though they faced the same consequences for their choices as if
playing human subjects, their e¤ort decisions no longer a¤ected any persons payo¤s.
Table 1 provides a summary of these treatments.
A subjects payo¤ was calculated as follows. Note these gures are in Berkeley
Bucks $, converted at $66.6 Berkeley Bucks to 1 US$, which is how it was presented
to subjects.3 Each participant received an endowment of $12 (Berkeley Bucks $) each
period from which they could choose costly e¤ort. E¤ort costs $1 for each unit of
e¤ort. Total payo¤ was then
i = 12 +
xi
x
15  xi
3A copy of the instructions given to subjects is available in the appendix.
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where x = xj
3
is the average e¤ort across i0s group and i chooses e¤ort xi 2 [1; 12]:4
Hence, each participants e¤ort is discounted by the average e¤ort, so a higher average
e¤ort will reduce payo¤s, ceteris paribus. This is the relative performance evaluation
similar to the contract used by Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul (2005).
The stage game (or one-shot) Nash equilibrium for homogeneous and Selsh play-
ers is to play xi = 10 for all i; which is below 12 (the upper bound of the action
space). Coordinating on xi = 1 is sustained by a continuation probability  > 60%
(optimal one-shot deviation from Pareto Dominant outcome is to play xi ' 7:5).
Therefore, our  = 95% should guarantee the feasibility of collusion for utility maxi-
mizing rational Selsh agents.
For the nal stage, subjects were again given the same allocation price menus as
in the rst stage. Critically, subjects did not know they were going to have this nal
allocation opportunity. Instead, they were told at the beginning of the experiment
they would have a nal stage with some additional opportunities to increase their
payo¤s. We do not consider this data in this study.
After the allocation decisions, subjects completed a risk aversion test as in Holt
and Laury (2002), and a basic demographic questionnaire. We now turn to our
theoretical analysis.
3.1 Theoretical Considerations
In this section, we explore the various incentives when group composition varies
in terms of social preferences. Consider rst the incentives in the stage game of an
indenitely repeated game without communication as in our No Chat/Observability
treatment. Assume that a player believes her group memberse¤orts are x1o and x2o
and her utility is given by
i = 12 +
xi
x
 15  xi + i
h
12 +
x1o
x
 15  x1o

+

12 +
x2o
x
 15  x2o
i
; (1)
where i 2 [0; 1] represents the degree of Other-Regardingness.5 If i = 0; the player
is a Selsh individual and only values his own payo¤. If instead i > 0; the player is
Other-Regarding (i.e., she at least partially internalizes the negative externality that
she imposes on others), and increasingly so as i increases. For i = 1 the individual
places equal weight on all group memberspayo¤s.
As can be shown, the (one-shot) best response function is
4Although subjects were not told to do so, almost all entered e¤ort choices as an integer. We
had an e¤ort lower bound of 1 to create an upper bound for payo¤s. The e¤ort upper bound of 12
came from the periodic endowment of $12:
5Note that we have assumed an Other-Regarding individual cares about each of her other mem-
berspayo¤s equally. Although this specication is a stylized version of Fehr and Schmidt (1999),
it allows us to illustrate the role of social preferences on collusive outcomes.
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xi (i) = max
np
45 (1  i) (x1o + x2o)  (x1o + x2o) ; 1
o
(2)
Best response e¤ort is strictly decreasing in the degree of Other-Regardingness i:
Thus, subjects who put higher weight on otherspayo¤s choose lower levels of e¤ort.
Note that in the extreme case of i = 1 (i.e., an individual maximizing a utilitarian
welfare function), the best-response is always to choose minimal e¤ort. Solving for
the stage game Nash equilibrium yields
xi = max
(
90 (1  i)
 
1  j

(1  k)
 
1  2i + ij + ik   jk
 
3  2  i + k + j+ ij + ik + jk2 ; 1
)
In an interior solution for all three group members (x1; x2; x3 > 1), aggregate e¤ort
equals
X = x1 + x2 + x3 =
90 (1  i)
 
1  j

(1  k) 
3  2  i + k + j+ ij + ik + jk (3)
It is easily veried that aggregate e¤ort is strictly decreasing in the degree of other-
regardingness of each single group member. Note that if i = j = k  910 the unique
stage game equilibrium will be exactly the collusive outcome: all play minimal
e¤ort of 1 even in a shot game. Of course, playing the one-shot best response in each
period is an equilibrium in the dynamic game. In this case, Other-Regarding players
unambiguously depress overall group e¤ort.
In dynamic games a collusive equilibrium outcome is another possibility. For this
possibility, punishment is essential. Other-Regarding individual, however, have less
incentives to exert punishment upon observing a defection. For example, consider
the canonical grim-trigger strategy. Group members begin by coordinating on mini-
mum e¤orts and continue each period until at least one group member deviates from
minimum e¤ort; in response to such a deviation, a player punishes by choosing the
stage game Nash equilibrium e¤ort forever. Note that the aggregate e¤ort of the two
other group members in the stage game Nash equilibrium (for an interior solution)
from the viewpoint of i is equal to
X i =
180 (1  i)
 
1  j
2
(1  k)2 
3  2  i + k + j+ ij + ik + jk2 (4)
It can be veried that X i is decreasing in j and k. Consequently, the pun-
ishment for a grim trigger strategy is less for group member i as her other group
members are increasingly Other-Regarding. Hence, this suggests that it could be
more di¢ cult for groups with more Other-Regarding players to sustain the collusive
outcome of extreme e¤ort depression. This is especially the case for groups with
only one Selsh individual, as he has the strongest incentives to take advantage of his
8
group members his cost of deviating goes down as othersOther-Regarding concerns
go up. In Table 2, we illustrate how the costs and benets of deviating relate to e¤ort
decisions for a group of 3 individuals, with varying numbers of Selsh (i = 0) and
Other-Regarding (i = :5) players. For an example of Other-Regardingness hindering
collusive outcomes, we calculate the minimal continuation probability necessary to
sustain a collusive outcome of (1; 1; 1) under grim-trigger strategies. A higher minimal
continuation probability is associated with lower costs of deviation for at least one
group member, so players need to care more about the future to sustain collusion. In
the extreme, a continuation probability of one means that only a group of individuals
who care equally about the present and the future are able to collude. We nd that
the continuation probability necessary for sustaining collusion is non-monotonic in
the number of Other-Regarding group members. In particular, the minimum contin-
uation probability is lowest in a group with only Other-Regarding individuals, but
highest in a group with one and only one Selsh player. In fact, given our parameters
and grim-trigger strategies, a group with only one Selsh individual will not be able
to collude. Thus, while a group of only Other-Regarding members should be worst
for a principal, as collusion is most likely and periodic e¤ort is lowest, it may be
the case that the principal only needs to replace one Other-Regarding worker with a
Selsh one to maximize total e¤ort.
Since we randomly determine group composition, our No Chat/ Observability
treatment allows us to test if Other-Regarding subjects exert lower e¤ort on aver-
age. If playersdecisions converge on Nash stage-game outcomes, we expect Other-
Regarding players to unambiguously decrease group e¤orts. However, Other-Regarding
subjects may make it more di¢ cult to collude and sustain collusion due to their in-
centives to punish less severely, which could increase average group e¤ort.
Total e¤ort Lowest continuation probability
(one-shot Nash) to sustain collusion
3 Other-Regarding 15 0.364
2 Other-Regarding & 1 Selsh 18 > 1
1 Other-Regarding & 2 Selsh 23.5 0.791
3 Selsh 30 0.609
Table 2: Group composition and e¤ort provision (Selsh: i = 0; Other-Regarding:
i = :5). The second column shows aggregate equilibrium e¤ort in the one-shot
game. The third column shows the lowest continuation probability necessary to
sustain collusion under grim-trigger strategies in the indenitely repeated game.
In this analysis, we have illustrated the potentially opposing e¤ects of social pref-
erences on e¤ort in a dynamic setting using one-shot Nash equilibria and grim-trigger
strategies. Indenitely repeated games, however, typically admit a myriad of equi-
libria. Nonetheless, communication may help players converge on a particular equi-
librium through the emergence of a coordinating leader (e.g. Hermalin 2012). Thus,
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it may also be the case that introducing communication creates another channel for
social preferences to inuence collusive outcomes, through the likelihood of a subject
emerging as a leader suggesting coordination on minimal e¤ort. We explore this pos-
sibility via our Chat/Observability treatment. To determine the net e¤ect of all of
these channels, we now turn to our empirical analysis.
4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Examples of Decisions
We begin with some examples of actual giving and e¤ort rates of particular groups
to illustrate subjectsbehavior. We analyze the e¤ect of social preferences on e¤ort
in Section 4.3 and coordination leadership in Section 4.4. Figure 1 illustrates the
patterns of decisions across time. In the rst stage (periods 1 to 9), we can observe
the number of tokens each player in the group keeps for him or herself. In the second
stage, (periods 12 to 40) we observe the choice of e¤ort ranging from 1 to 12.6
Starting with Panel 1 we observe a heterogeneous pattern of keeping in the rst
stage: One subject keeps everything to himself, while the others share almost equally.
Thus, this group consists of one Selsh and two Other-Regarding subjects. Fur-
thermore, it provides an example of perfect collusion in the Chat/Observability
treatment: Subjects coordinate on minimal e¤ort during almost the entire second
stage.
Coordination on minimum e¤ort (1; 1; 1) also occurs absent communication.
Panel 2 provides an example in the No Chat/Observability treatment on how subjects
slowly manage to coordinate on lower e¤orts.
Panel 3 shows a group from the Chat/Observability treatment. In this case,
behavior in the second stage is surprising: Participants play a strategy that is not the
Pareto-dominant one. Subjects alternate between providing maximal and minimal
e¤ort. In each period a di¤erent subject reaps the rents of outperforming the other
subjects With the help of the chat, they perfectly coordinate on this synchronized
play. Although this does not allow the subjects to reach the maximal group payo¤,
this form of collusion still leads to high payo¤s relative to the one-shot Nash outcome.
Finally, communication does not guarantee successful coordination. Our last ex-
ample, Panel 4 provides a case in point. In this group from the Chat/Observability
treatment, subjects choose maximal e¤orts in almost every round.
6We omitted periods 10 and 11 from the graphs. They are used for an extended categorization
of subjects in the Appendix.
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Figure 1: Examples of group giving and investment decisions (S denotes session
number and G group number).
4.2 Categorizing Social Preference Types fromGivingMenus
Table 3 summarizes the mean choices of our subjects under all 9 price vectors in
treatments: 1) Chat/Observability, 2) No Chat/Observability and 3) No Chat/No
Observability.7 We will analyze the Robot treatment in section 4.6.
We see that regardless of the price of giving, subjects keep on average just above
70% of their endowment. Using these choices, we sort our subjects into Selsh and
Other-Regarding. A subject is categorized as Selsh if he or she does not allocate
any tokens to the other group members in any of the nine periods. All subjects who
at some point allocated tokens to their group members are categorized as Other-
Regarding. We explore other categorizations in the Appendix. Taking together the
three treatments (Chat/Observability, No Chat/Observability and No Chat/No Ob-
servability) most of the participants (79.59%) are categorized as Other-Regarding.
The balance of 20.41% of subjects are categorized as Selsh.
As described in Section 3 subjects were randomly allocated into groups without
7These vectors (a; b; c) represent the price a of giving to ones self, the price b of giving to player
1, and the price c of giving to player 2.
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Period Price vector Keep (min;max) Give to 1 Give to 2
1. (1; 1; 1) 70.66 (33,100) 15.21 14.13
2.
 
1; 12 ;
1
2

73.39 (0,100) 13.24 13.37
3.
 
1; 34 ;
3
4

71.82 (0,100) 13.98 14.20
4.
 
1; 54 ;
5
4

72.29 (20,100) 14.13 13.59
5.
 
1; 32 ;
3
2

71.03 (20,100) 14.67 14.30
6.
 
1; 1; 23

71.80 (0,100) 15.90 12.30
7.
 
1; 1; 34

73.46 (0,100) 15.03 11.51
8.
 
1; 34 ;
1
2

77.09 (0,100) 12.33 10.58
9.
 
1; 54 ;
3
4

72.72 (0,100) 16.18 11.10
Table 3: Giving Rates.
regard to their social preference type. Figure 2 shows the distribution of Selsh
subjects across groups. Since subjects were allocated randomly and Selsh subjects
are relatively rare we do not observe groups with only Selsh group members in
the Chat/Observability and No Chat/Observability treatments. Otherwise, we do
observe random variations across groups in the number of Selsh subjects which we
will use to identify the e¤ect of group composition in the next sections.
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Figure 2: Allocation of Selsh across groups.
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4.3 Social Preferences and E¤ort
Figure 3 provides a summary of e¤ort choices over time by treatment. In all three
treatments we observe average e¤ort of around 8 units at the beginning of the relative
incentives stage. As expected, there is a strong tendency to coordinate on lower e¤orts
over time when subjects are able to communicate and observe past behavior in the
Chat/Observability treatment (dashed line). When communication is not possible,
observability by itself does little in sustaining lower levels of e¤ort overall. In both
such treatments, average e¤ort stays close to the one-shot Nash equilibrium level for
the Selsh type (dotted and solid line).
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Figure 3: Average e¤ort by treatment over time.
How do individual social preferences and group composition relate to e¤orts? To
give an answer to this question we exploit the random allocation of subjects into
groups. We compare behavior of groups with di¤erent numbers of Selsh and Other-
Regarding individuals in each of the three treatments.
Figure 4 gives a rst overview of our ndings. Consider rst panel a) in the upper
left corner. We compare the average e¤ort of subjects categorized as Selsh with the
average e¤ort of subjects categorized as Other-Regarding. We see that for all three
treatments, average e¤ort is higher for subjects categorized as Selsh, although a t-
test rejects equality only for the No Chat/Observability treatment (p-values: p<0.60
in Chat/Observability; p<0.01 in No Chat/Observability and p<0.35 in No Chat/No
Observability). Comparing the No Chat/Observability and No Chat/No Observabil-
ity treatments, average e¤orts are similar to the one-shot Nash equilibrium e¤orts
(i.e., e¤orts of 10 with  = 0) rather than a collusive outcome. Accordingly, as pre-
dicted in Section 3:1 for non-collusiveoutcomes, Other-Regarding subjects provide
lower e¤orts on average.
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Figure 4: Overview of E¤ects of Social Preferences on E¤ort.
Panel b) in the upper right corner takes the view of the principal, who is interested
in group e¤ort. In the graph, we consider average group e¤ort as a function of the
number of Selsh players within a group. In the two treatments where communication
was not possible, we observe that each additional Selsh group member increases
average group e¤ort. In particular, a group with only Other-Regarding members is
worst for the principal. The monotonicity in social preferences and the relatively high
levels of e¤ort again suggest that collusion does not play a big role and the results
are driven by the incentives of the stage game. In contrast, when communication is
possible, the e¤ect of Other-Regarding group members is non-monotonic. Average
group e¤ort is lowest when there is only one Selsh individual in the group. The latter
result is especially interesting in light of our discussion in Section 3:1: we argued that
a group with only Other-Regarding members will have lower stage-game aggregate
e¤ort and require a lower minimal discount factor than a group with one or more
Selsh individuals. Furthermore, a Selsh individual in a group of Other-Regarding
has the strongest incentive to take advantage of her fellow group members and defect.
However, we observe a totally di¤erent pattern. Groups with only one Selsh member
show the lowest levels of e¤ort. While these charts are suggestive, not all di¤erences
in group average e¤ort are statistically signicant. Thus, we explore di¤erences in
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group e¤ort choices as a function of the number of Selsh subjects through regression
analysis as reported in Table 4.
Panel c) in the bottom left corner (respectively, panel d) in the bottom right
corner) shows how individual e¤ort of a Selsh (respectively, Other-Regarding) sub-
ject varies with the social preferences of the other group members. For a subject
categorized as Selsh we nd that e¤ort is increasing in the number of other Selsh
group members for all treatments. In contrast, for an Other-Regarding subject we
nd monotonicity of e¤orts only in the non-communication treatments. This suggests
that, absent communication, both Selsh and Other-Regarding subjects respond more
aggressively to fellow group members if they are Selsh. In the Chat/Observability
treatment, however, Selsh respond more aggressively to other Selsh group mem-
bers, while Other-Regarding respond less aggressively to the addition of the rst
Selsh individual to the group.
Overall, these results suggest that, absent communication, average e¤orts are
consistent with one-shot Nash equilibrium strategies. When communication is in-
troduced, however, e¤orts resemble the collusive outcome and results are somewhat
surprising: The presence of one Selsh individual leads to lowest aggregate e¤orts.
We return to analyze this treatment in more detail in Section 4.4.
To further explore our results, we construct a dependent variable of group ef-
fort averaged over all rounds of play (at stage 2, our relative performance stage).
Groups are randomly assigned, so these averages are independent of individual as-
signment to groups. Table 4 reports the results of regressing average group e¤ort
on the number of Selsh individuals in a group. Column 1 shows the results for the
Chat/ Observability treatment, column 2 and column 3 report the results for the
No Chat/Observability treatment and No Chat/No Observability treatment, respec-
tively. In the Chat/Observability treatment, we do not nd a signicant e¤ect of Self-
ish group members. This is to be expected given that we identied a non-monotonic
relationship from Figure 4. In contrast, when communication is not possible (No
Chat/Observability treatment), and when neither communication nor observability
are allowed (No Chat/No Observability treatment), each Selsh group member in-
creases average group e¤ort by approximately .9 units on average, which equals a
12% increase over our baseline mean e¤ort of roughly 7.5 per period.
In the remainder of this section, we explore further the results of our No Chat/
Observability treatment. To disentangle the e¤ect of ones own social preference
from group composition e¤ects we estimate a random e¤ects model for the No Chat/
Observability treatment, clustering standard errors on the group level.8 We exclude
the Chat/Observability treatment in which composition e¤ects are also feasible as
we will devote the next section to this treatment. Table 5 reports our results. We
nd further evidence that Other-Regarding subjects choose signicantly less e¤ort.
Now controlling for group composition, these subjects choose 1.5 fewer units of e¤ort.
8Throughout the paper when using a random e¤ects regression we cluster at the group level.
Results are qualitatively unchanged when clustering at the individual level.
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Chat No Chat / Obs No Chat / No Obs
# Selsh 1.063 0.872 0.860
(1.626) (0.379) (0.163)
Constant 3.180 9.453 8.540
(1.022) (0.440) (0.266)
Observations 21 21 7
Adjusted R2 -0.012 0.081 0.656
Standard errors in parentheses
 p<0.1,  p<0.05,  p<0.01
Table 4: E¤ect of a groupssocial preference composition on group e¤ort.
E¤ort
Period -0.0538 (0.0294)
Selsh 1.478 (0.401)
# Other Selsh 0.569 (0.412)
Constant 10.85 (0.502)
Observations 1827
R2 within/between 0.0322/0.0954
Standard errors in parentheses
 p<0.1,  p<0.05,  p<0.01
Table 5: E¤ect of own and others social preferences on own e¤ort (treatment 2).
The group composition e¤ect on the other hand, is positive but insignicant. Thus it
seems that it is mainly the own social preference type that determines e¤ort choices
throughout the relative performance stage in this treatment.9
Although not included in this table, we have explored whether ones reaction to
the social preferences of ones group members depends on ones own social preference
type. We did not nd any signicant interaction e¤ect between own social preference
type and group members social preference type. We do not include lagged e¤ort
choices due to the issue of inconsistent estimates from such a specication. Nonethe-
less, when doing so, our results are qualitatively the same. In addition, since e¤ort
choices are constrained to be between 1 and 12; we re-run our analysis using a Tobit
9In principle, one could conduct this analysis also for the No Chat/No Observability treatment.
In this treatment feedback during the game is minimal and thus it is unclear how to interpret any
interaction e¤ects. If we run the regression, we do nd a positive and signicant interaction e¤ect
(more other Selsh correlates with higher e¤ort). Due to the small sample size of this supporting
treatment, however, we do not want to overly emphasize this result.
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panel model. We nd these results are qualitatively the same. We also conducted
our individual level analysis controlling for gender, education major, and risk prefer-
ences, and nd the results qualitatively unchanged. Finally, rather than using social
preference types as regressors, we conduct individual-level regressions using instead
the average amount of endowment kept by a subject to examine if subjectsinten-
sity of social preferences matters. We nd consistent results with this measure of
selshness. We also consider an alternative classication of social types: we classify
Selsh subjects as those that keep on average at least 90% of their endowment (as
opposed to 100%). Using this less stringent denition of Selsh subjects we nd that
the magnitude of the coe¢ cient estimates on Selsh types decreases, but is still sig-
nicant. However, for the group level regressions although the sign is still correct,
the coe¢ cient estimates are no longer signicant.
Overall, the similarity of e¤ort levels across the No Chat treatments and the
positive di¤erence between Selsh and Other-Regarding individualsaverage e¤orts
within each treatment, suggest that collusion does not play a major role. More impor-
tantly, these results seem to be driven by Other-Regarding individuals internalizing
the negative externality of their e¤ort choice by exerting one-shot competitive e¤orts.
When communication is possible, social preferences do not seem to a¤ect e¤orts
linearly in the number of Selsh group members. We found that groups with only
one Selsh member seem to be most successful at choosing low e¤orts. In the next
section we investigate deeper into the reason behind this non-monotonicity. In order
to do this we di¤erentiate between 1) encouraging low e¤orts through chat and 2)
e¤ectively choosing low e¤orts. Social preferences might relate di¤erently to these
two aspects of non-competitive e¤orts. To disentangle these e¤ects we analyze the
chat messages of each group and identify leaders that initiate collusive-like behavior
and their social preferences.
4.4 Leadership
In the Chat/Observability treatment, a subject can take the initiative through chat,
asking the group members to jointly exert low e¤ort. This way the problem of equilib-
rium selection can be overcome. This channel was absent in all other treatments. We
elicit this measure of leadershipfrom the chat messages. We di¤erentiate between
two kinds of leaders: First Leaderand Right Leader.10 A First Leader is the rst
subject to propose coordination on low e¤orts, without consideration for the actual
e¤ort level proposed. Thus, this is a relatively broad category. A Right Leader, on
the other hand, is the rst to propose coordinating on the minimum e¤ort case (i.e.,
all providing e¤ort of 1).11 We identify 18 First Leaders (29%) and 13 Right Leaders
10We initially collected a third category: Failed Leader for a subject who called on his group
members to decrease e¤orts but was not listened to/followed. This is a rare event in our study and
thus we do not include this variable in our analysis.
11We also had both a research assistant from Erasmus University Rotterdam and from North-
western University independently code the leadership variables. Using these classications, we nd
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(21%) among the 63 subjects (21 groups) in the Chat/Observability treatment (11
subjects are both a Right Leader and a First Leader).
We start by providing a breakdown of the social preferences of the subjects we
identied as leaders. Panel 1 of Figure 5 shows the distribution of social preference
types in the sample of First Leaders and in the sample of Non-First Leaders. Panel
2 shows the distribution for Right Leaders and Non-Right Leaders.
20%
80%
33.33%
66.67%
N ot a  Firs t Leader Firs t Leader
S elfish Other Regarding
Panel 1: First Leader
18%
82%
46.15%
53.85%
N ot a  R igh t Leader R igh t Leader
S elfish Other Regarding
Panel 2: Right Leader
Figure 5: Social preferences of leaders.
For First Leaders and Right Leaders, we observe that Selsh individuals are more
likely to be both of these types of leaders. Using a chisquared test we do not nd
the di¤erence to be signicant for First Leaders (p=0.26) while it is signicant at the
5% level for Right Leaders (p=0.03). Thus we nd that, indeed, social preferences
are linked to the emergence of a coordination leader.
Given that we control for the e¤ect of social preferences that runs through leader-
ship in suggesting low e¤orts, which is specic to the Chat/Observability treatment, it
is still true that low e¤orts are related to group memberssocial preferences similarly
as in the other treatments. Table 6 reports the results of a random e¤ects model for
the Chat/Observability treatment. Column 1 shows a regression without considering
leader emergence, analogous to the one in Table 5 for the No Chat/Observability
treatment. In column 2 we add as a control whether a Right Leader has emerged
(i.e., a dummy variable that takes on a value of one once a Right Leader emerged
in the given group) and whether the subject herself is a Right Leader (i.e., a time-
invariant dummy variable that takes on value of one for all subjects who are classied
as Right Leader). We only consider the variable Right Leader because First Leader
is not found to be related to social preferences.12 Notice that the coe¢ cients of own
social preference as well as group memberssocial preferences are highly signicant
and larger in magnitude once controlling for leadership in this way. This means that
similar results in our following analysis. The instructions given to the RAs are provided in the
appendix.
12Our results are robust to including controls for First Leader emergence and type as well, though
coe¢ cients on social preferences become smaller in magnitude.
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after controlling for the e¤ect of social preferences running through leadership emer-
gence, social preferences lead to signicantly lower group e¤orts. This is consistent
with our hypothesis of Other-Regarding individuals reducing e¤orts. The e¤ect is
slightly larger in magnitude than in the No Chat/Observability treatment. We nd
that a Selsh subject puts in 2 units e¤ort more per period than an Other-Regarding
subject. Furthermore, the presence of an additional Selsh group member increases
a subjects own e¤ort by 2 units per period.
(1) (2) (3)
E¤ort E¤ort E¤ort
Period -0.133 -0.0725 -0.0728
(0.0276) (0.0250) (0.0245)
Selsh 1.069 2.054 2.797
(1.596) (0.737) (0.687)
# Other Selsh 1.060 2.067 2.864
(1.581) (0.694) (0.600)
Right Leader Exists -5.709 -3.661
(0.637) (0.423)
Right Leader 0.0784 0.107
(0.350) (0.338)
RLeader*Selsh -2.729
(0.678)
RLeader*#OthSelf -2.800
(0.562)
Constant 6.628 7.353 6.911
(1.471) (0.741) (0.789)
Observations 1827 1827 1827
R2-within/between 0.1000/0.0379 0.2117/0.7465 0.2184/0.7848
Standard errors in parentheses
 p<0.1,  p<0.05,  p<0.01
Table 6: E¤ect of social preferences on individual e¤ort controling for leadership
(Chat/Observability treatment).
Column 3 investigates further into the timing of the e¤ect of social preferences. We
include interactions of social preference measures and the emergence of a leader. We
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nd that social preferences depress e¤orts before a Right Leader emerges in a group.
Once a leader emerges there is no di¤erence between Selsh and Other-Regarding
choices. Selsh are thus no more likely to deviate from a collusive outcome. Finally,
note that the coe¢ cient of Right Leader is insignicant. Thus, Right Leaders do not
lead also by good example, i.e. putting in lower e¤ort but only through cheap talk.
We conclude that social preferences are an important determinant of group e¤ort
also in the Chat/Observability treatment, though in a more nuanced way. On the
one hand, subjects can use communication to coordinate the group on a collusive
outcome. Such a leader tends to be a Selsh individual. This explains why the
presence of one Selsh individual reduces e¤orts in the Chat/Observability treatment.
On the other hand, controlling for the relation of leadership and social preferences,
Other-Regarding subjects have a tendency to put in lower e¤ort than their Selsh
counterparts, exactly as in the non-communication treatments, suggesting these indi-
viduals internalize the externality their e¤ort inicts on their group members. Finally,
from a principals perspective our results suggest that in a work environment where
communication is possible a heterogeneous social-preference group leads to the lowest
work e¤ort.
4.5 Propensity to Collude
Thus, far we have been exploring the relationship between social preferences and
depressed e¤orts. In this section, we explicitly consider the most extreme version
of depressed e¤orts: collusion. While we are naturally not able to observe our
subjectsstrategies directly, we take an indirect approach and measure the frequency
of collusive outcomes,outcomes that are consistent with coordination on minimum
e¤orts: all three players coordinate on e¤orts of 1 (i.e., e¤orts of (1; 1; 1)) for the last
3 periods of play. We additionally include as collusive outcomethe setting where
all three players coordinate on the outcome of two players choosing e¤ort of 1 while
a third player chooses maximal (payo¤) e¤ort of 12; and then the players alternate
the player that gets the maximal payo¤. As it might be expected, this latter form of
collusion is only witnessed in the Chat/Observability treatment where subjects were
allowed to coordinate via chat.
Table 7 reports the proportion of groups achieving the collusive outcomein the
Chat/Observability treatment. Here, we partition groups by the number of Selsh
members, which we have observations for groups with 0; 1; or 2 Selsh members.
Similar to our results on e¤orts in Section 4.4, when chat is available, groups with 1
Selsh member are more likely to exhibit the collusive outcome than groups with no
Selsh members. When we expand the denition of collusionto include the case
of the group cycling e¤orts of (1; 1; 12) across players, we again nd groups with 1
Selsh member are more successful at achieving the collusive outcome than groups
with no Selsh members. This further corroborates our result that social preferences
seem to matter in nuanced ways when communication is possible: Selsh individuals
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play an important role in facilitating coordination on the collusive outcome.
# Selsh Propensity to collude Propensity to collude
group members on (1; 1; 1) on (1; 1; 1) or alternating (1; 1; 12)
0 (7 groups) 43% 57%
1 (13 groups) 77% 92%
2 (1 group) 0% 0%
Table 7: Propensity to colludeby # of Selsh in the Chat/Observability treatment.
For the No Chat/Observability treatment, coordinating on a collusive outcome
was more di¢ cult, since subjects were not able to chat. As shown in Table 8, we nd
for this setting that 1 out of 21 (a mere 5%) ends up with minimum e¤orts and only if
the group has no Selsh members. If we expand the denition of collusive outcome
to include two subjective cases of collusion (we report their behavior in the appendix),
then we nd one additional group with no Selsh members and one additional group
with 1 Selsh member successfully collude. These results lend some support to
our prediction that groups with only Other-Regarding are most likely to successfully
collude, though because of the relatively rare occurrence of collusive outcomes, these
have to be taken with some caution. Generally, it seems that collusion is not a
main driver of behavior in this treatment and results seem more consistent with the
predictions of the one-shot game.
# Selsh Propensity to collude Propensity to collude
group members on (1; 1; 1) (self-classication)
0 (14 groups) 7% 14%
1 (5 groups) 0% 20%
2 (2 group) 0% 0%
Table 8: Propensity to colludeby # of Selsh in the No Chat/Observability treat-
ment.
One might object at this point that individuals we categorize as Selsh are the
ones that understand the game and optimal strategy better than individuals we
categorize as Other-Regarding. Thus, naturally they will be the ones suggesting
non-competitive e¤orts, not because of their social preferences, but because of their
better understanding of the game. While this is indeed a possibility, this rationale
alone does not explain that, when controlling for leadership, Other-Regarding sub-
jects put in lower e¤orts on average than Selsh ones. This is especially true for the
No Chat/Observability treatment: without communication, we might expect that
a subject understanding the game better would try to lead by example in order to
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induce the other group members to follow his or her lead. In order to investigate fur-
ther, in the No Chat/Observability treatment, we categorize subjects as attempting
to be leaders when expending an e¤ort less than four given that in the round before
his or her group members expended e¤orts larger than 9. We do not systematically
observe Selsh subjects leading by examplewith reduced e¤orts to induce the op-
timal strategy to their group members. If anything, we observe Other-Regarding
types trying out low e¤orts; however, we do not nd a statistical di¤erence in
the two distributions (Fishers exact test, p-value = 0.67). Furthermore, we do not
nd that subjects with a background in Economics or Business are more likely to be
Right Leaders (Fishers exact test, p-value = 0.67). To more rigorously alleviate this
and similar concerns, we conduct one more treatment, which is designed to turn
o¤social preferences. Of course, this is very hard with human subject interaction.
Nonetheless, our nal treatment, which we present in the next section, attempts to
approximate just such a procedure, by matching humans with computer simulated
subjects.
4.6 Robot Treatment
This treatment is similar to the No Chat/Observability treatment in the sense that
subjects cannot communicate but get to observe the e¤orts and payo¤s of their group
members after each period. The crucial di¤erence is that in stage 2, instead of
randomly pairing subjects to other subjects we paired them to two simulated subjects
we call robots.13 In particular, we programmed 42 robotsubjects who react to past
e¤ort decisions by approximating what real subjects did in the No Chat/Observability
treatment. Specically, each robot chooses current period e¤ort based on last
periods own e¤ort and e¤ort choices of the other two subjects in the same way
the real subject did on which it is based on. Critical in this treatment is that it is
no longer the case a subjects e¤ort choices impose a negative externality on other
players, as the robots receive no payo¤s. Thus the fundamental di¤erence between
the No Chat/Observability and the Robot treatment is that the latter attempts to
turn o¤subjectssocial preferences since their actions no longer a¤ect any other
player. Note, however, that social preferences are not completely absent, as the robots
choices simulate decisions by participants whose social preferences did matter. Thus,
subjects decisions can reect beliefs about the past subjectssocial preferences. This
in fact is helpful for us, as it allows us to distinguish an alternative hypothesis:
Selshsubjects di¤er in their beliefs about their group members(re-)actions from
Other-regarding subjects. If this were the case, we should still see a di¤erence
between Selsh and Other-regarding e¤ort choices in this treatment. Di¤erences
in e¤ort should vanish in this treatment, however, if beliefs about other players
social preferences do not play a role in depressing own e¤ort choices. Furthermore,
13We provide additional description of this treatment, as well as analysis on the e¢ cacy of the
robots in our appendix.
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other potential confounds such as skill di¤erences or di¤erences in patience between
Selshand Other-Regardingare also not turned o¤by this treatment, allowing
us further to test the appropriateness of our initial categorization.
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Figure 6: Comparing e¤orts between Selsh and Other-Regarding types over time.
We rst compare subject behavior for the No Chat/Observability treatment and
the Robot treatment graphically. Figure 6 depicts the e¤ort proles over the 29 peri-
ods of play by treatment for Selsh and Other-Regarding individuals. We nd that in
the rst half of the relative performance stage (16 periods from periods 12 to 27) the ef-
fort of Selsh and Other-Regarding subjects in the Robot treatment is not statistically
di¤erent (t-test, p-value 0.2122), supporting the validity of our categorization. There
is some e¤ort divergence in the intermediate term though however, by the end of the
relative performance stage, e¤orts of di¤erent social types converge back to similar ef-
fort levels. In fact, in the last 5 rounds a t-test cannot reject equality of e¤orts (p-value
0.1578). Interestingly, e¤orts of all social preference types in the Robot treatment con-
verge towards the e¤orts of Selsh subjects in the No Chat/Observability treatment.
For the last 5 periods a t-test cannot reject equality of e¤orts of any social prefer-
ence type in the Robot Treatment compared to Selsh in the No Chat/Observability
treatment (i.e., Selsh in the No Chat/Observability treatment vs. Selsh in the
Robot treatment, p-value .7315; Selsh in the No Chat/Observability treatment vs.
Other-Regarding in the Robot treatment, p-value .1578). When we compare Other-
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Regarding individuals e¤orts across treatments we do nd a signicant di¤erence
(Other-Regarding in the No Chat/Observability treatment vs. Other-Regarding in
the Robot treatment, p-value .0016). If we include the nal ten periods of e¤ort
though, there is a statistical di¤erence in e¤ort between Other-Regarding and Selsh
players (p-value .002) in the Robot treatment, as suggested by the chart.
Thus, while predictions are borne out in the rst half, we nd only partial evidence
of equal behavior between Selsh and Other-Regarding players for the entire last
half of the relative performance game in the Robot treatment. Perhaps, subjects
forget that they are playing robot subjects and began behaving as if they are
playing real subjects. We did attempt to minimize this possibility by reminding
subjects on each e¤ort-entry screen that their e¤ort choice will not a¤ect the payo¤s
of any participants. Unfortunately, we cannot rule out that subjects disregarded this
message after 15 periods. It nonetheless does seem these results suggest beliefs are
not driving the di¤erence in choices for di¤erent types of players: beliefs should loom
largest in creating di¤erences at the beginning of the relative-performance game before
they converge based on experience. However, we observe just the opposite pattern.
If instead analyzing individual rather then average aggregate e¤ort choices, which
may mask individual behavior, we nd a similar pattern of similar e¤ort choices across
social preference types. Table 9 reports the results of regressing individual e¤ort on
own and group memberssocial preference types for the No Chat/Observability and
the Robot treatment. The coe¢ cient estimate for Selsh is half the value as in the
No Chat/Observability treatment and is no longer signicant, though we do note the
sample size is smaller.
No Chat/Observability Robot
E¤ort E¤ort
Period -0.0538 (0.0294) 0.0168 (0.0285)
Selsh 1.478 (0.401) 0.824 (0.813)
# Other Selsh 0.569 (0.412) -0.280 (0.996)
Constant 10.85 (0.502) 9.152 (0.685)
Observations 1827 609
R2 - within/between 0.032/0.095 0.003/0.049
Standard errors in parentheses
 p<0.1,  p<0.05,  p<0.01
Table 9: E¤ect of social preferences on individual e¤ort treatment 2 vs. treatment 4.
Overall, we believe the Robot treatment provides further evidence that social pref-
erences (and not beliefs) matter in creating and sustaining non-competitive e¤orts.
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5 Conclusion
We explored how a relatively new dimension of worker heterogeneity a¤ects the per-
formance of workers subject to relative performance pay. In particular, we found that
a basic form of social preferences, the degree of other-regardingness, is substantially
linked to reduced e¤ort choices, but in a nuanced manner. First, players categorized
as Selsh are more likely to coordinate their group members to minimal e¤orts, when
communication is available. Second, controlling for the existence and emergence of
such leaders, players categorized as other-regarding exert lower levels of e¤ort an av-
erage of over 50% lower e¤ort. Thus, when communication is available, a group that
is heterogenous in social preferences can most successfully create and sustain very
low e¤orts over those groups with no Selsh members. However, when communica-
tion is not available, groups of Other-Regarding players produce the lowest levels of
e¤ort. Since we nd little evidence of collusive outcomes, this is again consistent with
the theory that Other-Regarding players internalize their e¤ortsnegative externality
imposed on other playerspayo¤s.
To further validate our ndings, we also attempted to switch o¤subjectssocial
preferences through our Robot treatment. For this experiment, we simulated the re-
sponses of human subjects via machine, thus removing a players negative externality.
By the end of the treatment, Other-Regarding subjects acted like Selsh subjects.
This provided further evidence that other-regarding individuals are indeed depressing
their e¤orts as they internalize the negative externality of higher e¤ort.
Our ndings have important policy implications for personnel policy. In organi-
zations with more other-regarding workers (e.g., non prot rms or rms engaged
in corporate social responsibility), relative performance incentives are likely to not
be as e¤ective as in other organizations. For rms already using relative incentive
pay, screening workers according to their social preferences could improve perfor-
mance. Human resource departments often provide potential workers with psycho-
logical based exams. These could readily incorporate explicit measures of other-
regardingness. Similarly, information obtained from resumes, such as a potential
workers involvement in philanthropic activities, could shed light on a workers de-
gree of other-regardingness.
When workers are closely engaged so that communication ows freely and output
is easily observed, relative performance schemes are also more likely to encourage
noncompetitive behavior. In this setting, it is the Selsh worker that is likely to
instigate a particularly low e¤ort regime with other-regarding workers.
We note that we did not consider the case where workers might value their rms
payo¤. Thus, our results can be seen as applying to settings where ownership is
dispersed or the worker is removed from the top of the hierarchy. Finally, our measure
of leadership is endogenous to the e¤ort exerted in each group. It is an interesting
challenge to design an experiment in which leadership varies with incentives and
analyze how it relates to social preferences.
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Although our setting only allows for the possibility of valuing negative external-
ities, to the extent workers also value their positive externalities, other-regarding
preferences could mitigate the free rider problem amongst teams. That is, a team of
workers with Other-Regarding preferences that receive a share of the common output
are more likely to provide higher outputs, as they further value their e¤orts positive
e¤ects on their team members. We leave these topics for future research.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Broader Social Preference Classications
In this section we explore two alternative social preference categorizations. In partic-
ular we will use dictator menus 1-11 to classify subjects into di¤erent types depending
on their choices. First we follow Andreoni and Miller (2002) and use menus 1-9 to
broaden the category of Other-Regarding into subjects who tend to give more when
the prize of giving increases (we call them Complements) and subjects which tend
to react by giving less (we call these individuals Substitutes). The idea is that the
former represents the motive of fairness, while the latter represents the motive of e¢ -
ciency. Thus, menus 1-9 measure whether a subject values fairness or e¢ ciency under
favorable inequality. In a second analysis, we use dictator menus 10-11 to see whether
subjects have an aversion to unfavorable inequality (i.e., unfavorable in terms of their
own payo¤ relative to others). In the following, we provide more detail on the these
categorization procedures, as well as some additional analysis using these expanded
categories.
Complements vs. Substitutes
We use decision menus 1 to 9 (see Table 3 for an overview) to classify partici-
pants as Selsh, Complement (Rawlsian) or Substitute (Utilitarian). To do
so, we rst compute the relative giving rates of an archetypal Selsh, Utilitarian and
Rawlsian individual according to the preferences in Table 10. We denote player is
monetary payo¤ as i and the total number of players n: Thus, an archetypal Self-
ish type, is only interested in her own monetary payo¤. In contrast, an archetypal
Rawlsian player only values the minimal monetary payo¤ of all of her group mem-
bers payo¤s. Finally, an archetypical Substitute simply maximizes her groups total
monetary payo¤.
Social Preference Types Utility
Selsh i
Complement (Rawlsian) min fi; jg
Substitute (Utilitarian) i + j 6=ij
Table 10: Overview of social preference types.
To categorize subjects, we then measure the Euclidian distance from each of the
participantsdecisions to each of these archetypesdecisions. We compute such dis-
tance for each choice and then we compare the average distance across periods to
each archetypes decision. We classify subjects as the archetype whose decision is
closest to the subjects decision.14 For treatments 1-3 we nd that, for our subject
14Since we only use relative giving rates between the other two group members, our classication
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population, 20% are Selsh, 63% are Complements and 17% are Substitutes. Consis-
tent with Andreoni and Miller (2002), hereafter AM, we nd that 20% of subjects are
(perfectly) Selsh, whereas AM nd that 23% of subjects are perfectly Selsh. 6.5%
of our subject are classied as perfect Substitutes, while AM nd 6.2%. In contrast to
AM we only classify one subject as a perfect Complement, while they nd 14.2% are
perfect Complements. Di¤erent from AM, we do not have any weakSelsh types,
as we categorize all Other-Regarding subjects (i.e., subjects that give to others) as
either Complement or Substitute types.
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Figure 7: Giving rates by social preference types.
Figure 7 illustrates giving behavior under our broader categorization of social
preferences types. We see that Selsh types, by denition, never give anything to
their group members. In contrast, Other-Regarding types give positive amounts,
on average, for every price vector. When the price of giving increases, Substitutes
typically react by decreasing their giving rate, while Complements do the opposite.
This is most easily seen for periods 6 to 9 where the price of giving to individual 2 is
always lower than the price of giving to individual 1 as can be seen in Table 3 . Thus,
as archetypal types would do, Complements react by allocating more to individual 1
while Substitutes react by allocating more to individual 2.
Table 11 is analogous to Table 4 and shows the results of a regression of average
group e¤ort on the number of Complements and Substitutes in a group. Both Com-
plement and Substitute group members reduce group e¤ort relative to Selsh group
members in the No Chat/Observability treatment and No Chat/No Observability
treatment by approximately .8 units. In the Chat/Observability treatment, a linear
regression again does not yield signicant results; this is to be expected given the
does not account for the intensity of social preferences. We can control for intensity separately by
including the overall giving rate of a subject.
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discussion in the main text of the confound of leadership. We will again consider the
e¤ect social preferences on leadership and explore whether it di¤ers by Complements
and Substitutes.
Table 12 is analogous to Table 5. Here, we present the results of a random e¤ect
panel regression model for the No Chat/Observability treatment that considers the
e¤ect of own and otherssocial preference type on individual e¤ort. The results from
our main analysis suggesting that Other-Regarding members exhibit lower e¤orts rel-
ative to more Selsh group members holds also when we consider our subcategories of
Other-Regarding: Complements and Substitutes. Complements as well as Substitutes
exhibit lower e¤ort than their Selsh counterparts. In fact, we cannot reject the null
hypothesis that Complements and Substitutes depress e¤ort by the same magnitude
(p-value 0:7102). Furthermore, we see that most of the e¤ort reduction is driven by
their own preference type (i.e., around 1.5 units) while the coe¢ cients on the other
group members social preference types are of the same sign, but much smaller in
magnitude and insignicant.
Finally, we turn to disentangling the e¤ect of social preferences on leadership and
individual e¤ort provision in the Chat/Observability treatment. Figure 8 reports
the distribution of social preferences among Non-Right Leaders and Right Leaders as
dened in Section 4.4. As before, Selsh are signicantly more likely to become Right
Leaders (chi-squared test, p-value=0.034). The opposite is true for Complements (p-
value=0.031). Finally, for Substitutes we do not nd a signicant e¤ect on leadership
propensity (p-value=0.678).
18%
64%
18%
46.15%
30.77%
23.08%
Not a Right Leader Right Leader
Selfish Complement
Substitute
Figure 8: The distribution of social preferences among Right Leaders and non-Right
Leaders.
In order to disentangle the e¤ect of social preferences on the propensity to initiate
coordination from the e¤ect on e¤ort choice, we run a random e¤ect panel regression
analogous to Table 6 for the Chat/Observability treatment.
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Chat/Obs No Chat/Obs No Chat/No Obs
Avg E¤ort (Grp/Sess) Avg E¤ort (Grp/Sess) Avg E¤ort (Grp/Sess)
# Complements -0.593 -0.873 -0.919
(1.582) (0.389) (0.154)
# Substitutes -1.742 -0.856 -0.604
(2.009) (0.685) (0.265)
Constant 5.952 12.06 11.02
(4.017) (0.942) (0.388)
Observations 21 21 7
Adjusted R2 -0.036 0.030 0.637
Standard errors in parentheses
 p<0.1,  p<0.05,  p<0.01
Table 11: Group composition and average group e¤ort.
(1) (2)
E¤ort E¤ort
Period -0.0538 (0.0294) -0.0538 (0.0294)
Selsh 1.478 (0.401)
# Other Selsh 0.569 (0.412)
Complement -1.410 (0.386)
Substitute -1.714 (0.854)
# Other Substitutes -0.427 (0.669)
# Other Complements -0.604 (0.411)
Constant 10.85 (0.502) 13.46 (1.188)
Observations 1827 1827
R2 within/between 0.0322/0.0954 0.0322/0.0994
Standard errors in parentheses
 p<0.1,  p<0.05,  p<0.01
Table 12: E¤ect of own and others social preferences on own e¤ort (No
Chat/Observability).
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(1) (2)
E¤ort E¤ort
Period -0.133 (0.0276) -0.0727 (0.0249)
Complement -0.458 (0.901) -1.884 (0.760)
Substitute -0.997 (1.301) -2.245 (0.891)
# Other Complements -1.880 (0.723)
# Other Substitutes -2.348 (0.847)
Right Leader Exists -5.690 (0.636)
Right Leader 0.0990 (0.353)
Constant 7.839 (1.265) 13.36 (1.844)
Observations 1827 1827
R2-within/between .100/.012 .212/.751
Standard errors in parentheses
 p<0.1,  p<0.05,  p<0.01
Table 13: Leadership and Social Preferences
We report these results in Table 13. The rst column does not control for the
emergence of a Right Leader and whether or not an individual turns out to be a
Right Leader. The coe¢ cients on the social preferences are insignicant, though they
do indicate an e¤ort reduction by Complements and Substitutes. Controlling for the
emergence of a Right Leader and controlling for being a Right Leader increases the
magnitude of both coe¢ cients by approximately 1 unit, both statistically signicant
at the 1% level. Also, the social preference types of the other group members matter.
Having Complement or Substitute group members decreases own e¤ort by about
2 units as well. Overall we conclude that there is a di¤erences in the propensity
to initiate coordination by Substitutes and Complements; however, e¤ort choice is
relatively similar.
Unfavorable Inequality
In a second classication, we use dictator menus 10-11 to di¤erentiate subjects by
their propensity to reduce their own payo¤ in order to reduce unfavorable inequality.
Subjects were given an allocation vector and were able to choose an exchange rate
between zero and two which translated tokens into payo¤s for all group members.
Thus, an exchange rate of 2 maximizes aggregate output, while an exchange rate of
zero minimizes inequality. Table 14 summarizes the two menus and the decisions of
subjects in Treatments 1-3. Overall, many subjects were willing to reduce their own
payo¤ at least once to reduce inequality. Furthermore, the fraction of subjects who
destroy some of their payo¤ goes up and the average exchange rate goes down when
the allocation becomes more unfavorable. For our analysis, we denote a subject as
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Jealous when he or she chose an exchange rate of less than two in any of the two
menus. In treatments 1-3, 64% of subjects are classied as Jealous.
Menu (Allocation) Mean Percent where rate=2
10 (20,40,40) 1.796 77%
11 (2,49,49) 1.322 58%
Table 14: Average exchange rate chosen in menu 10 and 11.
Using the category of Selsh/Other-Regarding as well as Jealous/Non-Jealous we
construct 4 new social preference categories:15
 Disinterested: not Jealous and Selsh (10%)
 Benevolent: not Jealous and Other-Regarding (26%)
 Spiteful: Jealous and Selsh (10%)
 Inequity Averse: Jealous and Other-Regarding (54%)
Table 15 reports the results of an OLS regression of average group e¤ort on the
number of Benevolent, Spiteful and Inequity Averse with Disinterested as the omitted
category analogous to Table 4. In the Chat/Observability treatment, we do not nd
any signicant e¤ect of these social preferences types. In the No Chat/Observability
treatment we nd that Spiteful group members are responsible for highest group
e¤ort. On average, an additional Spiteful subject increases group e¤ort by 1.5 units.
We do not nd signicant di¤erences for all of other social preference types. In
contrast, in the No Chat/No Observability treatment, Disinterested group members
lead to highest group e¤orts. Given the low number of observations for this treatment,
however, this nding needs to be treated with caution.
Finally, we explore whether this extended categorization yields new insights on
the propensity to initiate coordination when communication is possible. Figure 9
reports the distribution of social preferences for Non-Right Leaders (left panel) and
Right Leaders (right panel) for the Chat/Observability treatment. As can be seen,
Spiteful individuals have the highest propensity of becoming a Right Leader. While
there are not enough observations for the Disinterested to make any meaningful
statement only 2 out of the 63 subjects in this treatment are Disinterested we
see that both types of Other-Regarding subjects have a lower propensity of becoming
a Right Leader. This is especially so for Inequity Averse subjects. Thus, relative to
an Inequity Averse, a Spiteful subject is 3.3 times more likely to emerge as a Right
Leader.
15Population proportions are for Treatments 1-3
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(1) (2) (3)
Avg E¤ort (Grp/Sess) Avg E¤ort (Grp/Sess) Avg E¤ort (Grp/Sess)
# Spiteful -4.822 1.488 -3.199
(3.274) (0.421) (0.764)
# Inequity Averse -4.766 -0.807 -1.777
(2.945) (0.489) (0.324)
# Benevolent -4.614 -0.761 -2.276
(3.101) (0.512) (0.337)
Constant 17.73 11.79 13.97
(8.834) (0.934) (0.764)
Observations 21 21 7
Adjusted R2 0.087 0.017 0.844
Standard errors in parentheses
 p<0.1,  p<0.05,  p<0.01
Table 15: Group E¤ort and Inequality Aversion (omitted category: Desinterested)
Finally, controlling for the emergence of a leader, as in Table 6, we can separate
the relation of social preferences and leadership emergence from general e¤ort choices.
Table 16 summarizes the results. Note that we pooled Disinterested with Spiteful
subjects due to the lack of observations for Disinterested in this treatment (i.e.,
only 2 subjects out of 63). Overall the results mirror our results from the main
section. Inequity Averse subjects behave similar to Benevolent ones, though we only
get signicance for the Inequity Averse. This could be driven by the lower numbers
of Benevolent subjects.
Conclusion
To summarize, the main results of our two alternative categorizations are:
 Both Substitutes and Complements reduce e¤ort relative to Selsh types. We do
not nd signicant di¤erences in Substitutesand Complementse¤ort choices.
 When communication is possible, Complements are less likely to initiate coop-
eration through chat, while this is not the case for Substitutes.
 There is (weak) evidence that especially Spiteful subjects lead to high group
e¤ort provision. There is not much di¤erence between Benevolent and Inequity
Averse subjects in terms of their e¤ort choices.
35
4%
14%
62%
20%
46.15%
38.46%
15.38%
Not a Right Leader Right Leader
Disinterested Spiteful
Inequity Averse Benevolent
Figure 9: Distribution of social preferences among non-Right Leaders and Right
Leaders under extended categorization two.
 Spiteful subjects are most likely to become leaders, while Inequity Averse sub-
jects are least likely.
 Overall, a simple categorization into Selsh and Other-Regarding explains most
of the variation in the data.
6.2 Appendix B - Subjectively Categorized Collusion
Figure 10 shows the e¤ort choices of groups S4G1, S5G3 and S5G5 that we categorize
as ultimately colluding.Group S5G3 achieves the collusive outcome in the strictest
sense all group members choose minimal e¤ort of 1 in the nal periods. The other
two groups we subjectively categorize as coordinating on low e¤orts.
6.3 Robot Details
For this treatment, we needed to develop a program that would create a similar
experience for a subject playing a computer to if she was instead playing actual
subjects. By experience we mean if the human subject played certain strategies, she
would obtain similar results whether she played actual subjects or the computer. To
accomplish this, we used actual subject behavior from the No Chat/Observability
treatment to determine how the computer would respond to a subjects e¤ort choices
in the Robot treatment. In particular, we had the computer choose e¤ort each period
based on the composition of e¤orts of players in the last period. Although in practice
subjects could use an entire history of play to determine their action for the current
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(1) (2)
E¤ort E¤ort
Period -0.133 (0.0276) -0.0766 (0.0255)
Inequity Averse -0.698 (0.910) -0.682 (0.333)
Benevolent -0.276 (1.523) -0.698 (0.601)
# other Inequity Averse -2.831 (1.679)
# other Benevolent -2.223 (1.721)
Right Leader Exists -5.316 (0.633)
Right Leader 0.149 (0.403)
Constant 7.839 (1.265) 14.61 (3.338)
Observations 1827 1827
R2- within/between .1/.01 .212/.719
Standard errors in parentheses
 p<0.1,  p<0.05,  p<0.01
Table 16: Leadership
period, regression analysis shows virtually all of historys e¤ect on current choices is
captured in just the last period of play.
Recall each subject can choose e¤orts between 1 and 12. This provides 123, or
1,728 possible e¤ort outcomes for any given period. However, most subjects only
faced a small fraction of all these possible outcomes, or what we refer to as states.
Thus, we collapse the 1,728 to 27 possible states by creating a coarse partition of
e¤orts. In particular, we bucket e¤ort into low (1-4 units), medium (5-8 units), or
high (9-12 units). In addition, we assume a player does not care about the identity
of which player provides a higher e¤ort, should they be di¤erent e¤orts. This reduces
the possible statesto 18. With this coarser partition, at least one player faced each
of these possible 18 states in the No Chat/Observability treatment. Our next step is
to then build a set of strategies for 63 simulated players, which are based on each of
the 63 actual subjectsactions in the No Chat/Observability treatment. For each of
the possible states,we create a transition matrix for each simulated player. The
transition matrix contains the simulated players action for each of the possible 18
states they might face. Often a given subject had historically chosen a di¤erent
action when facing the same state.In this case, we assign a probability for taking
each action based on the historical likelihood of the human subject choosing each ac-
tion. In the event a subject did not face a given statein the No Chat/Observability
treatment, we impute the simulated subjects action as the average action of all play-
ers that faced such a state.The 13 (of 63) subjects who faced the smallest number
of statesresponded to just 3 statesand the subject who faced the most states,
reacted to 11 states(out of 18). The mean of di¤erent states faced by a given
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Figure 10: Choices of groups classied as colluding.
subject was 5.2 and the median was 4. In the end, after imputation, we had created
a complete transition matrix that assigned likelihood of each action for each of the
18 states" for all 63 simulated subjects.
For the robot treatment, when subjects reached the relative performance stage,
they were randomly assigned to two simulated subjects (out of the possible 63) that
would react to the past periods e¤orts based on the transition matrix. For the rst
period, however, the selected simulated subject simply chose the same e¤ort as the
corresponding human subject did in the No Chat/Observability treatment for the
rst period of the relative performance stage.
Before running our experiment, we wanted to make sure the simulated subjects
behavior resembled real subjects. Again, for this treatment, we were attempting to
turn o¤social preferences by presenting subjects with the same play experience as
when facing real subjects but without generating any negative externality against the
payo¤s of their opponents. We performed two tests to check for the validity of our
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simulated subjects (i.e., robots). First, we matched the simulated subjects into the
same group pairings the human subjects experienced. For each of these 21 groups, we
then ran 1000 repetitions of each group interacting over 29 periods. Table 17 reports
the result of this simulation. A very common outcome for the human subjects was
for groups to end with all players choosing high e¤orts. In fact, four groups all
chose maximal e¤ort of 12 in the nal period. When these four group pairings are
instead played by simulated players, they end up with this maximal outcome 95%,
91%, 71%, and 23% of the time. They all end up in the stateof (high, high, high)
e¤ort (i.e., all players choosing e¤ort above 8), 60-97% of the time. In terms of the
extreme outcome of e¤ort depression, colluding on e¤ort choices of (1,1,1), there is
only one group of human subjects that achieved this. This one group represents 5%
of all human subject groups. The simulated group of these same members ends with
(1,1,1) 7% of the time and the state(low,low,low) e¤ort roughly 13% of the time.
In contrast, this same group ends at highest e¤orts of (12,12,12) just .6% of the time.
% of the time in which the robotsnished in:
Group Final e¤ort all 12 all < 4 2:< 4, 1:12 all > 8 all 1 2:> 8 1: 4
S4G1 12,1,1 0.002 0.235 0.181 0.245 0.126 0.124
S4G2 6,12,12 0.083 0.002 0 0.57 0 0.033
S4G3 9,9,12 0.251 0 0 0.871 0 0
S4G4 12,5,12 0.464 0.003 0.002 0.636 0.001 0.029
S4G5 12,12,10 0.751 0 0 0.838 0 0.117
S4G6 12,10,12 0.028 0 0 0.966 0 0
S4G7 12,4,11 0.173 0.004 0.014 0.211 0 0.099
S5G1 10,9,11 0.007 0.005 0.002 0.574 0 0.004
S5G2 12,12,8 0.03 0.044 0.021 0.07 0.013 0.084
S5G3 1,1,1 0.006 0.129 0 0.472 0.071 0.016
S5G4 12,4,12 0 0 0 0 0 0.168
S5G5 2,3,2 0.091 0.25 0.002 0.124 0 0.008
S5G6 12,12,12 0.231 0.001 0.036 0.604 0.001 0.219
S5G7 11,12,5 0.037 0.003 0.003 0.084 0.001 0.088
S6G1 12,12,12 0.952 0 0 0.973 0 0.027
S6G2 7,8,12 0.313 0 0 0.683 0 0
S6G3 12,5,4 0.035 0.009 0.002 0.125 0.003 0.037
S6G4 12,12,1 0.015 0 0.062 0.098 0 0.833
S6G5 12,12,12 0.707 0 0 0.722 0 0.032
S6G6 12,12,12 0.907 0 0 0.971 0 0.029
S6G7 9,9,9 0.013 0 0 0.913 0 0.044
Table 17: Simulations (1000 repetitions of each group)
A second test we conducted was to simply randomly match all simulated sub-
jects into groups of three and then compare the distribution of these group out-
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comes to the distribution of actual group outcomes of human subjects in the No
Chat/Observability treatment. Table 18 reports these ndings. We did this in a series
of 100, 1,000, and 10,000 repetitions of group pairings. While again just one group, or
5%, of human subject groups colluded, in our largest samples, we found 1% of simu-
lated groups perfectly colluded (i.e. ended up in (1,1,1) e¤orts). In terms of maximal
e¤ort, whereas 19% of human subject groups ended with choosing (12,12,12), 17%
of randomly matched robot groups experienced the same ending. For the common
outcome of human subjects nishing in groups with e¤ort choices of (high,high,high)
(i.e., e¤ort all higher than 8), human subjects achieved this 43% of the time versus the
robot groups did so 49% of the time. Although, frequencies are not identical to the
realized draw of 21 human subject groups, we were comforted by these simulations
that these robots reasonably resemble human subject behavior.
Simulations
Last round e¤ort % Human % Robot (100) % Robot (1000) % Robot (10000)
all 12 0.19 0.17 0.19 0.19
all  4 0.10 0.02 0.02 0.02
2:  4, 1: 12 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.01
all > 8 0.43 0.49 0.53 0.53
all 1 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.01
2: > 8, 1:  4 0.13 0.10 0.07 0.06
Table 18: Randomly matched groups (simulations)
6.4 Leader Classication Details
Attached le
6.5 Instructions for Subjects
Attached le
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Instructions for RA 
 
The Excel sheet has 21 tabs, each one provides data of chat messages for a group of three players. The 
variables are: 
 
Session: identifies which experimental session the individual participated in, numbering 1 to 3 
Group: identifies the group number that the participant was assigned to, numbering 1 to 7 in a given 
Session 
Subject: an indicator for a particular participant number, numbering 1 through 21 for a particular 
Session 
Period: records which period the chat or effort choice took place, ranging from 12 to 41 
Effort: effort choice of participants for a given period, ranging from 1 to 12 
Chat: records any chat message a player sends for other group members to be read for a given period. 
The period for Chat is recorded in chronological order. That is, a message coded in period 12.16 was sent 
before a message coded in period 12.25. However, note, any message recorded as period 13.XX was 
made after the effort choice for period 12 but BEFORE the effort choice for period 13.  
 
We need you to classify any subjects that behave according to any of the following definitions of 
leaders. In particular, record in a new Excel sheet, the Session number, Group number and Individual ID 
of the respective leader (as defined below) and the period that the leadership chat takes place.  
 
First leader is defined as: 
“The first person in a group to suggest coordinating and his/her other group members follow the 
suggestion” 
 
Right leader is defined as: 
“The first person to suggest coordinating on efforts of (1,1,1) and his/her other group members follow 
the suggestion” 
 
Failed leader is defined as: 
“The first person to suggest coordinating and his/her other group members do NOT follow his/her 
suggestion” 
 
What follows is an example. Please note to enter the period as simply the chat period without the 
decimal places. For example, if the Right Leader suggested to coordinate on effort (1,1,1) in period 
12.16, then simply enter period 12. 
 
Session Group Subject Period First 
Leader 
Right 
Leader 
Failed 
Leader 
1 1 2 17 X X  
2 2 6 23 X   
3 3 16 33   X 
 
 
 
Instructions  
 
This is an experiment in the economics of decision-making. If you follow these 
instructions carefully and make good decisions, you might earn a considerable amount of 
money. The currency we will use throughout the instructions and the experiment is the Berkeley 
Buck. We will denote it as “$” and the exchange rate is $ 66.6 Berkeley Bucks per US$ dollar.  
 
This experiment will occur in three stages today. The first stage will consist of dividing 
sums of money between yourself and two other randomly matched and anonymous participants. 
On each screen (there will be 11 screens in total for this stage), you will have to divide exactly 
100 tokens between yourself and the two other participants in your group. The value of each 
token can vary for group members and for different screens.  
 
Screens 1-9 will be similar to the screen shown in the following Figure:  
 
 
 
The value of the token for each person (including you) is displayed just to the left of the 
input box where you will enter how many tokens each person will receive. For example, for the 
above screen, 1 token allocated to yourself yields you $1, 1 token designated to your other group 
member (labeled Participant 1) will yield him/her $1, and 1 token designated to the final group 
member (labeled Participant 2) will yield him/ her $1.50. You will need to allocate an amount of 
tokens to each person (including you) so that in total 100 tokens are allocated. Thus, any one 
input box could have the number 0 to 100 entered, but all three boxes together must sum to 100.  
<STOP READING HERE> 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Screens 10-11 will be similar to the screen shown on the following Figure: 
 
 
 
Here you are given an allocation of tokens to you and your group members and you have 
to determine the value of the tokens to each of you. You can choose a value as little as $0.00 to 
as great as $2.00 per token.  
 
To determine your final payoff, one of your group members’ decisions (including yours) 
will be randomly selected with equal chance in each screen (period). 5 of these 11 selected 
allocations will be randomly chosen with equal chance. These 5 selected allocations will be used 
to compute the final payoff for ALL members in your group (including you).  
<STOP READING HERE> 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the second stage you will be grouped again randomly and anonymously with two 
other participants. You will remain matched with the same group members for the balance of the 
experiment. You will be making effort choices over a number of periods, as the following Figure 
shows: 
 
  
 
The total number of periods for this stage is unknown to all group members. Instead, 
there will be a 95% chance you will continue for another period.   
 
In the Figure above, the first sentence in the center of the screen indicates your name 
(Participant A, B or C) for the rest of the experiment. The second sentence points out that you 
can chat with the other participants in your group, using the chat box on the left. The remaining 
information on the screen reminds you how your payoff for each screen will be calculated. Your 
payoff is calculated as follows: 
 
For each period, each participant begins with a sum of $12 (Berkeley Bucks). You will 
choose effort between 1 and 12 units, where each unit of effort costs $1. After each period, you 
will be paid a wage of $15 TIMES your chosen effort DIVIDED by the average of your group of 
3 participants’ effort choices. This means that your effort will be evaluated relative to the 
average effort of all the participants in your group (yourself included). If your effort is higher 
than the average, the wage $15 will be multiplied by a number higher than one, and if it is less 
than average, it will be multiplied by a number lower than one. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For example, if you choose 1 unit of effort and another group member chooses 4 units of 
effort and the other chooses 10 units of effort, your TOTAL payoff for the period is $ 14, and it 
is computed as follows:  
 
1/3*(1+4+10)
1 *$ 15  - $ 1  + $ 12 = $ 14  
Your Effort
Average Effort
Wage Endowment
Cost
 
 
Notice that your effort DIVIDED by the average effort is equal to 1/5, so your relative 
compensation in this example would be 1/5 of $15 = $ 3. Hence, your total payoff would be $ 3 - 
$ 1 + $ 12 = $ 14. 
 
As another example, if you choose 4 units of effort and the other two members each 
choose 3 units of effort, you will earn $26 (i.e., (4/3.33)*$ 15-$ 4+$ 12=$ 26), where 
3.33=(4+3+3)*(1/3) is the average effort. The minimum you can make in each period is $ 12.8 
and the maximum is $ 40.4. 
  
You will have 45 seconds to enter your effort choice and to chat. Feel free to take the 
allocated time to choose and to chat with your group members. Your time remaining will appear 
on the upper right hand side of your screen.  However, if a participant does not make his/her 
choice by the 45 seconds, the experimenter will prompt him/her to input his/her choice.  
<STOP READING HERE> 
 
After each period, you will see reported each of your group members' chosen efforts and 
the calculation of your payoff for that period. For instance, participant C will see the following 
(note the blue and red boxes below will have numbers in them during the experiment): 
 
 
Your payoff for this second stage will be the sum of all payoffs over all periods of play 
for this stage. 
<STOP READING HERE> 
 
 
In the final stage, you will be given a questionnaire that can yield some additional 
payoffs.  After all questionnaires are complete, final payments will be made to each of you.   
 
Each screen you see throughout the experiment has all the instructions necessary for the 
decision in that screen. 
 
Recall, during the session, all payoffs are expressed in terms of Berkeley Bucks.  
However, at the end of the session, all of your Berkeley Bucks will be converted at $66.6 
Berkeley Bucks to $1 US.  Thus, in US dollars, your final payment will be between $5 and more 
than $25, depending on how you do.   
 
 
 
Thanks! 
